Louisiana v Callais Transcript Snippet

Published on October 19, 2025 at 4:13 PM

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

Jackson?

 

JUSTICE JACKSON: So where in Section

2 does it mandate another minority district? I

mean, my -- my understanding, as I explored

with Ms. Nelson, is that Section 2 is the

mechanism by which we determine that equal

electoral opportunity is not being provided for

a certain minority group.

And we've interpreted in Gingles,

we've given some flesh to how one goes about

identifying that set of circumstances.

But I thought that's the end of it in

terms of the Court's announcement under Section

2, and the Court then turns to the state and

says: How do you want to remedy this? We've

got a problem.

And sometimes the state might draw a

second minority district. Sometimes it might

not. And yet your answer to Justice Barrett

was: Well, everybody just knows that that's

the automatic remedy. So can -- can you help

me figure out that disconnect?

 

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Well, Justice Jackson,

I think there's a reason why this Court's

voting precedents going all the way back to

Shaw I are so tied up with race. It's because

the -- the remedy, as parties and the courts

have understood Section 2 to operate, is almost

always going to be race-based. That's why they

went --

 

JUSTICE JACKSON: No, they're show --

they're so -- they're so tied up with race

because that's the initial problem, right?

That's where -- that -- that's the beginning.

The beginning is the claim that a person makes

under Section 2 that because of their race,

they are not being afforded equal electoral

opportunity.

 

It is a separate question as to how we

go about remedying that and the extent to which

we need to use race as a remedy. That's the

question we're here on today.

But the Section 2 issue is just what

circumstances do we look at to determine

whether this problem of unequal electoral

opportunity on the basis of race is occurring.

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Right. And a couple of

responses to that, Justice Jackson.

JUSTICE JACKSON: Wait. So can I just ask --

 

  1. AGUIÑAGA: So --

JUSTICE JACKSON: -- why is that not a

compelling state interest to -- to identify

areas in which that problem is occurring?

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Your Honor, of course,

as this Court recognized in SFFA, states can

remedy intentional discrimination if they --

JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I'm not talking

about the remedy. I'm not talking -- I'm

talking about the --

  1. AGUIÑAGA: They can identify –

 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Identify, all right.

  1. AGUIÑAGA: They -- of course.

JUSTICE JACKSON: So, if -- if I'm

right that Section 2 is about identifying the

problem and then requiring some remedy, I don't

understand why your answer to Justice Kagan's

question about is this a compelling state

interest is no. The answer is obviously yes,

that you have an interest in remedying the

effects of racial discrimination that we

identify using this tool.

Whether you go too far in your remedy

is another issue, right?

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Your Honor, I think

step zero in all these cases, it was certainly

step zero in the Robinson litigation, is the

Plaintiffs came in and said we want another

majority-Black district. I think the Court --

JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought they came

in and said we are not receiving equal

electoral opportunity because our votes are

being diluted.

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Which is the same way

of saying we deserve a second majority-Black

district.

 

JUSTICE JACKSON: No, it's not because

that -- again, just trust me on this -- the --

the second electoral -- or second district is a

remedy that one could offer for a problem that

we've identified. And the whole Robinson

litigation was about identifying the problem.

Is this really happening?

In many, many Section 2 cases, the

court says you're wrong, you're fine, there --

there is not an electoral opportunity being

denied to you, go away. In this case, the

court said, I see, I'm looking at the factors,

I appreciate what you're saying, you've proven

that we have this problem, and so the next

question is, how do we go about remedying it?

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Right. And the

problem, Justice -- Justice Jackson, that the

Middle District identified was not intentional

discrimination. And, in fact, I think, when I

hear my --

JUSTICE JACKSON: Why do you need

intentional discrimination to remedy a problem

like the one that I've identified?

  1. AGUIÑAGA: Because, if you're

going to use race the way that the Robinson

 

Appellants want the Court to use race in

drawing a second majority-minority district,

you've got to have a compelling interest.

JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.

 

 


Link to entire transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-109_5i36.pdf

 

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